Overlapping claims in the South China Sea

一个80后的人回首中国的改开历程

作为一个1981年出生在中国一个经济特区的人，我像大多数同龄人一样，在最前线经历了中国过去30年改革开放的一幕又一幕。很多东西当时没有明白。现在年纪大了，开始会结合世界环境想问题了以后，才开始慢慢明白。

我生长在珠海。尽管是邓小平亲手画圈指定的四个经济特区的一个，但珠海在80年初跟一个小渔村没什么区别。那时候珠海有一个百货公司，叫百货一条街。真如其名，那时候珠海就那一家百货公司。里头的商品99%都是土得掉渣的国产货。偶尔会有几个日本或者香港进口的自动铅笔和文具盒，可以想象作为小学生的我那时看着是多么眼馋的。总而言之，80年代的珠海，物质商品是十分匮乏的。所有的外国进口货都只能在友谊商店才买得到，而且要用“兑换券”，不能直接用人民币购买。而珠海那时是毗邻澳门的特区，比内地的情况已经是好不少了。

由于离港澳相近，珠海和珠江三角洲很多其他城市一样，在家庭和文化上和港澳有着千丝万缕的关系。我们家有不少亲戚在港澳，我们自己从小也收看香港的翡翠本港台的电视节目长大。小时候的我们很羡慕港澳的亲戚，因为他们每次回来探亲都穿得十分洋气，并带着一大堆日本和美国品牌的商品回来。我们这些大陆长大的小孩不免有些小自卑。记得有一次香港的一个表哥拿着他的一个模型车给我看，很自豪的跟我说这是日本产的。搞得我都不好意思跟他一起分享自己的玩具了。我想香港人对大陆人的那种优越感就是从那时候开始的吧。

从那时候我就不太明白，为什么我们不能像香港澳门一样，进口卖那些先进又漂亮的外国货，而要在又破又土的百货一条街卖那些劣质的国产货呢？为什么香港澳门的街上都跑着花花绿绿的各种品牌的外国汽车，而珠海的街道上都是国产的桑坦那，金杯和一些跟历史片里似得苏联车呢？ 为什么麦当劳在港澳满街都是，而珠海到95年才有第一家呢？为什么我小时候都得吃国产的零食，而跟我同龄的港澳亲戚却去着西式的超市吃着舶来的食品呢？那些问题困扰了我整个童年。很多问题直到最近我才明白。

最近读了一本韩国人Ha-joon Chang写的一本书，叫<<自由贸易下的秘密>>。其中有一章讲他自己亲身经历韩国的经济是怎么起飞的。1969年前，韩国以出口农产品和低端纺织品为主，比非洲很多国家还穷。韩国政府清楚知道，要发展经济，必须要扶持本国的制造工业。因此1970年代的韩国，跟我小时候的珠海一样，是绝对买不到外国货的。因为买外国货意味着本国的同类产品没法发展，而且这些外汇被浪费了。韩国政府努力保护本国产业，并严格限制出口赚回来的外汇流通，利用这些外汇来引进更先进的生产技术和设备。可以说是全民勒紧裤腰带来打造了三星，现代，LG，浦项制铁等几个后来世界性的企业。

80-90年代的中国，正处于勒紧裤腰带来打造自己工业体系的时期。想象一下，如果那时候就让西方的先进商品自由流通在中国的市场，还会有人买中国货么? 中国会有自己的民族产业么？ 如果那时候就让外汇在中国自由交易，中国的人民币现在还有自己的自主权么？ 不像泰国那样整个国家被索罗斯卖空就不错了。拉美国家就是一个活生生的例子。由于奉行所谓的“自由贸易”， 拉美国家的市场完全被西方产品占领。自己完全没有工业。完全靠出口低价原材料来维持经济。由于货币跟美元自由兑换，阿根廷的货币动不动就通货膨胀几百上千倍。

勒紧裤腰带30年后的中国，现在是世界第二大经济强国。当年夸自己用日本货的香港亲戚，现在用的还是日本货，因为没有自己拿得出手的商品。而中国大陆的土孩子们长大后打造出华为，联想，阿里，格力等走向世界的品牌。香港明星如黄伟文成天以怎么找到一些调转的欧洲日本设计师服装为荣，国母彭丽媛第一次出国访问时却大大方方地穿着广州本土设计大衣和手袋。经过30年的努力，我们慢慢从为自己的产品害羞，变成为自己的产品自豪。现在要有可能，我都尽量买中国的品牌。不光是为了省钱, 买的时候心里更享受着一丝骄傲。

中国要打的“三大战役”

　　以反腐败为抓手、以周永康为重心，新一届政府打了一场大仗，就像复刻了解放战 争时期的“辽沈战役”：查办石油系如同打下锦州，剩下的都是瓮中捉鳖；此后对四川 官场的彻查、政法系统的清理可以看作是血战四平、围猎长春。

　　但是，辽沈战役只是一个开端，重要的是后续怎么办，下一步在哪里？

　　第一大战役：四中全会与法治社会

　　四中全会即将召开，主题已经提前确定：依法治国。对此，需要为习近平主席和本 届政府的“超前动作”点赞。一般而言，一中二中定人事，三中搞经济，四中抓党建和 落实，这次四中全会抓法治，可谓特例。

　　首先，原本以为依法治国这样的议题会在下一届任期、至少是下一年才会大动作， 但是让人看到了本届政府“一万年太久，只争朝夕”的精神。以庸俗的政治观来看，目 前还处于打老虎、拍苍蝇的进行时，还处于王岐山所说的“治标”阶段，是运动反腐。 这时候强调依法治国，有些人难免会以为这是一种“收官”的信号。但是，想一想，徐 才厚案还未定夺，新一批的巡视组还在地方扎根，应该不是反腐运动的终结，更可能是 把制度建设和治标运动同步进行——倘如此，幸甚。

　　其次，现在主流的反腐运动究其实是治党、治军之策，但是，中国社会的腐败根深 蒂固、范围极广，需要运动反腐、制度反腐、群众反腐的结合。法由人而定，法依人而 行，谈何容易！比如，严法之下，不少地方政府出现了不作为、但求无过的“看官”， 等等，挑战众多。

　　近期，众多国企内部的腐败被查办，不少外企也因行贿、垄断等诉诸司法，吴英案 、唐慧案等民间民粹对司法的干涉也屡见不鲜……这些不同层面的变相违法案例，只靠 中央决心，断然无法解决，严肃法纪、公开透明还是根本所在。但是，中国并不缺法律 条文，而是执行不力，有法不依。这种情况下，提出依法治国的重心，恐怕不是立法、 守法，而是关注预防、执法、及违法之后的惩戒。对此，还需要很多创造性的解决方案 ，这也应该是此次四中全会的着力点。

　　综合看，反腐运动与法治，仍然可以视作是辽沈战役。

　　第二大战役：高效市场经济与优化分配

　　首先，要完善高效公平的市场经济机制，但不能掉入陷阱。比如，某知名经济学家 曾经强调市场的万能性，最近也不得不承认市场也分为好的市场、坏的市场。殊不知， 这也是另一种思想上的混沌，好、坏本身就是道德法则，与立场有关。强人如刘汉者， 自然认为官商就是对他最好的机制；得暴利如地产商者，也可以满口正义成为创业导师 ，认为他们的资本是应得的……

　　市场优劣，第一要看它是否促进了生产力，有很高的资源配置效率；第二就是它是 否相对公平。比如，垄断国企自然必须改，特别是要建立董事会、经理人和监管人结合 的公司治理机制，需要优化经济增加值考核，需要向社保分红，需要引入国企间竞争， 逐步打开私企牌照准入等市场化举措，也需要反腐——但是，这与崽卖爷田、变相管理 层收购毫不相关。在中国最牛的企业，如华为、阿里巴巴、招行等，管理层所持股权反 倒不多。

　　而且，中国的市场建设中，最严重的问题是政府僭越与缺位并存。比如，本周李克 强总理提到的政府过多的审批有寻租嫌疑，比如，对土地出让的过多干预是裁判员参与 比赛的问题；反过来，现在市场中还有很多政府该干而没有干好的，需要去补足，比如 ，食品药品监管、国资贱卖、地产商各种逃税避税……这种情况下的自由化只能是一切 权利归资本。

　　其次，市场不是万能的，必须通过制度优化财富分配。在全球30多个发达国家里， 日本、韩国、德国、法国、北欧五国的贫富差距都不算大；而美国、英国为代表的盎格 鲁撒克逊法系则要大得多，几个并不发达的金砖国家反倒基尼系数很高，这都与它们的 经济制度休戚相关，特别与它们的经济分配制度相关。不如，更低的资本税必然导致贫 富差距过大，而对促进经济增长几无帮助。对该问题，在欧美炙手可热的法国经济学家 皮克提的《21世纪资本论》所述颇多。

　　中国有太多人致富是靠着“封建资本主义”的裙带关系(比如，很多私营矿山来自 低价非法获取国家资源)，“野蛮资本主义”的资本增值(比如很多房地产商囤地待涨) 。这些问题导致了社会的极大不公平，是贫富差距里不能容忍的部分，是封建主义和资 本主义里那些最阴暗的部分。所以，需要建设现在还千疮百孔的市场，但是又不能让政 府僭越或缺位；要解决贫富差距问题，不能放过裙带资本、野蛮资本，但是又要鼓励真 正的企业家精神和动物精神。这个战役几乎攸关所有官僚资本和野蛮资本家的利益，比 之反腐，难度有过之而无不及。

　　要顺利解决市场化问题、显著解决贫富差距问题，就要坚定不移完善市场制度，兼 顾保护优秀合法企业家利益，需要和日本一样与资本一方“春斗”，需要和解……可以 视为平津战役。

　　第三大战役：和平崛起与生存空间

　　与内政相比，关注外交的人要少得多。但是，在地球村当中，中国的未来与全球的 未来密不可分，中国必须要在全球寻找资源、寻找市场，直面竞争又要广泛合作——所 以，某种程度上，国际关系的成败也关系到国内的很多事务的成败。

　　本届政府在外交方面应该说积极进取、刚中带柔，延续了中国在外交上的成熟思路 并有明显推进。其中，政治上依靠中俄战略合作伙伴关系、金砖四国峰会、中非峰会、 上合组织四大互相交叉的不结盟合作；经济上借助77国集团、金砖银行、中欧多国货币 互换、东盟10+3等关系让中国的外交基线变得非常稳健。同时，中国与欧洲多国实现了 经贸上的紧密合作，在政治上与英、法、德等距离外交，与“老欧洲”的关系大体无虞 ；在复杂的中东关系上，中国没有过早受到诱惑卷入，堪称明智。

　　如是，主要矛盾落在了南海、东海为核心的太平洋沿岸，日本、菲律宾、越南背后 都是中美角力，这也是最难处理的一对矛盾。中国数年内的实力都不足以挑战美国，但 是，又必须现在就直面站在门口的巨人，如何和平崛起又保障自身的生存空间，相当不 易。

　　这种竞争，最好的格局就是：军事上威慑但不破局，政治上合作为主竞争为辅，而 在经济战场上暗中角力。其实，我们已经可以看到这种格局：八一建军节之前，中国举 行了备受瞩目、近年来最具实战性的朱日和军事演习，低调公布了有史以来最强大的东 风41战略导弹，威慑之意明显；政治上，在东乌克兰、伊拉克、巴勒斯坦等地，两方都 相当谨慎，宁可置身事外、选取弃子战术，生怕陷入泥潭影响主战场；而在双方利益最 攸关的地区，无论是中日关系、中菲关系上，又互不相让……这种格局肯定会在相当长 时间内存在。最终，战场可能在企业和经济战场展开。偏偏在经济领域，特别是企业市 场上，政府所能起到的作用并不是很多，更多要靠企业自身，政府更多是顺势而为。

　　比如，最近一段时间，中国政府都在积极去IOE(去IOE是对去“IBM、Oracle、EMC ”的简称，三者均为海外IT巨头)，针对高通、微软等反垄断，还查办了葛兰素史克等 外企腐败案。去IOE可以给华为、浪潮等IT企业一些空间，但是，在大多数领域，如专 利药、操作系统和芯片等领域，中国厂商相距甚远，未必就能给国内企业带来很大的市 场机会。这些主要市场说了算的领域，也不可能砸下四万亿就能起到效果。反倒是一些 领域的国企更为适合，比如，中石油已经超过埃克森美孚成为全球石油储量第一的公司 ，比如中国的高铁已经成为经济外交的一个重要手段……这其实与国企的身份关系不大 ，是因为这些领域恰恰不仅仅市场说了算。

　　可见，中国争夺国际生存空间的路还有很远，对国家来说风险重重又不得不为，对 企业和市场来说，还有赖于中国未来的企业家和90后、00后新生代们，是一场需要高层 指挥大兵团作战、但是又需求全民参与的“淮海战役”。

　　正是因为有了前期反腐体现出强大力度，人们当然对本届政府有更高的期望。政治 上的反腐与制度化、经济上的市场化与再分配、外交领域的发展空间与和平崛起，可以 视为本届政府需要后续挑战的三大战役——抑或需要多届政府延续下去的命题。

材料技术是中国走向制造强国的最大壁垒

老听说中国缺乏某某核心技术，制造业大而不强。中国到底具体缺了什么核心技术，而必须依赖西方国家进口呢？ 是不是所有中国进口的技术都是我们缺的技术呢？在我们不能造的产品里，具体是因为什么缺口和空白导致我们造不了呢？要回答这些问题，必须从中国在全球的产业结构中的位置这个大图像来分析。我自己一直对这个问题很感兴趣，在业余时间做了一些研究和了解。这里写下来跟大家分享交流一下。

在世界各国的经济发展的历史里，有一条简单而永恒的真理，就是一个国家要想富，必须得能设计和制造其他国家造不了的东西。如果其他国家也能造，那你得比人家成本更低。发达国家之所以发达，不是因为他们的律师和医生挣得比我们的律师医生多，或者他们的金融精英有多优秀，而是因为他们卖一架飞机等于我们卖一百万个海尔冰箱。这个道理我相信大家都容易明白的。我国从80年代开始，出口产品已经迅速地从低端加工产品（成衣，玩具等）升级成以中端的机电产品为主。这是一个很好的趋势。但是，这些机电产品，其他国家能不能造呢？ 答案是可以的。准确的说，这些产品，由于技术壁垒不高，很多东南亚国家都可以造。中国之所以还有出口的竞争力，靠的是人多，低利润和速度。所以，要成为发达工业国家，必须要能造一些技术壁垒高的产品。另外很重要一点就是，造东西不完全为了出口，也为了自给。在跟国计民生有密切联系的领域，例如能源，通信和国防等，核心的技术必须由自己掌握。否则在战争时期就人为刀俎了。

下面我来具体在汽车，能源，信息，航空和国防等领域来分析一下中国所缺乏的核心技术。

先说说我们生活离不开的汽车。几乎没有一个发达工业国家可以离开一个成功的汽车工业。关注汽车国产化的人，或者随便到汽车论坛里转转，都知道国产汽车有两个短板: 车身材料和发动机。汽车材料要求轻薄，但高强度。高强度钢板一直是中国钢铁行业的一个死穴。代表国内最高水平的宝钢的高强度钢板跟国外比强度只有人家三分之一不到。当强度做上去了，防腐蚀性能又不够好。大街上跑的汽车，无论国产还是日产，打开盖看看，基本用得都是日本的发动机。发动机的核心还是材料。发动机要求耐高温，但要轻。这就要高温铝合金。可惜这些技术中国一直没有掌握，导致汽车里最贵的发动机和钢板一直要进口。中国自己组装的汽车出口只能赚劳务费。

中国是一个能源匮乏的国家。尽管我们蕴藏丰富的煤矿，但是石油基本靠进口。最近跟毛子签订长期天然气合同，我们必须发展燃气轮机作为天然气发电的渠道。轮机叶片要求高温性能好，并保持高强度的合金。和飞机发动机涡轮盘片有点类似。这种金属材料技术是兵家必争之地，在文献专利里是只字不提的。一个连汽车发动机材料都没搞定的国家，谈何攻破燃气轮机呢？ 中国另外一个能源突破口是核电。现在中国的核电机组主要是第二，三代压水反应堆。要进入世界最高水平的第四代快堆，中国最搞不定的是反应堆压力容器。这个容器可以想象成一个巨型的高压锅，不但能耐上千度的高温，GPa的压力，而且还得抗高能粒子的长期辐射。毫无疑问，这又是一个极其挑战的材料问题。目前只有日本和法国可以做。显然人家会跟你开天价，或者甚至不卖给你啊。一重集团有实验堆，但离真正的反应堆还有一定距离。能源是一个国家的血管。美国通过控制日本韩国的石油输送来控制他们。中国要不想战争时期被像蚂蚁一样掐死，就得发展自己的能源技术。

说说信息吧。应该说这是咱们强项了吧。百度，微信。阿里巴巴都去美国上市了。联想都成为全球最大组装机品牌。别忘了信息技术最核心的cpu芯片我们还造不了。别说cpu这种高端芯片了，打开苹果的iphone,里头最值钱的几个部件cpu, 射频通信，oled屏幕，这些主要的半导体产品，没有一样是国产的。每年中国工科大学出来这么多电子工程师，难道我们不会设计手机芯片里的数字电路吗? 仔细了解你会发现，半导体产业链最上层是半导体制造设备。这些光刻机，离子注入机还有刻蚀机动则上千万美元一台。除了自动化程度高以外，很大一点是国外厂商对半导体材料的工艺掌握得很深。试想，在12寸宽的硅片上做上十亿个22纳米的晶体管，要求良率是99.999%，这个不靠材料科学靠什么。

航空工业是现代工业的桂冠。还记得当年江总访问美国带着上亿民工的心血去跟人家换几架747吗? 直到2014年，上海的商飞集团才生产出短途的区域性客机。飞机技术难点跟汽车相似，只是难度高一百倍。机身要求轻，强的材料。最先进的787用碳纤维复合材料。这方面日本的东丽公司最厉害。自然，这也是对中国封锁的技术。当我们决定集中精力专攻T800等级的碳纤维，人家已经量产T1200了。没有轻的机身材料，自然飞得不远。一提起航空工业，不少人马上想起中国最最郁闷的短板，航空发动机。跟燃气轮机一样，航发的核心技术是涡轮叶片。发动机讲究推重比，就是推力和重量的比例。要提高这个比例，就要提高燃料燃烧的温度。这又是高温合金的问题。任何金属在高温情况下会发生蠕动。最好的叶片整个采用镍合金单晶，这样蠕动最低。估计你能看出一个规律来了吧，任何在极端环境下工作的技术，包括飞机发动机，燃气发电机还有核反应堆，都需要尖端的材料技术来实现。

最后谈谈军工。如果上述民用产品还能凑合进口的话(其实很多高科技民用产品都在禁运清单里)，先进的武器无论如何是得靠自己的了。这里头核心技术很多，但是材料确是军事专家公认的致命伤。军事上用得最多的砷化镓半导体用来做雷达里微波发生器。砷化镓单晶的生长中国也做不出来。这导致四代机的雷达系统得买俄罗斯的。洲际导弹要射程远，中段轨道得进入太空。在太空中精确制导所需要的芯片要抵抗宇宙射线的辐射，否则电子器件会失灵。这种芯片中国不会造。F35里的碳纤维复合材料我们望尘莫及。民用发动机都不会造的我们，战斗机的发动机得靠俄罗斯和乌克兰输送二手货。这些人家可以满天开价，我们又必须 得有的武器技术，足以让天朝的人通货膨胀都不知道原因是什么。

举了这么些例子，相信我的观点很明显了，中国要成为发达国家制造强国，最缺的核心技术中的核心，往往都是材料技术。你也许说我黄婆卖瓜。但是这是中国工程界的共识，连工程院士傅恒志也是这么说的。那为什么国家没有重视呢？为什么很多学材料的毕业生找不到工作呢？ 因为材料研发是个资本密集，周期非常长的项目。雇一个计算机程序猿，一台电脑就可以。雇一个材料研究员，要买上百万的实验仪器。可以说投入高，见效慢。这和我们中国人短视和爱凑合的性格很矛盾。材料研发确实不是穷国玩得起。工业最发达的美国德国和日本都是材料技术的强国，这个一点都不是偶然。其中以日本最优秀。缺乏政府扶持和民间投资，材料研究没有产业化，毕业生自然找不到工作。很多优秀的人才只能去搞金融地产或者搞手机网站。但是工业化中有些硬骨头必须要啃，没法偷工减料，没有捷径可走。材料技术的研发就属于这种硬骨头，是每个梦想进入发达工业国行列的国家必须啃的一根硬骨头。

产业升级没有捷径

很多人以为中国的从制造大国变成制造强国的产业升级可以走捷径。这些捷径包括：1. 山寨模仿外国最新产品； 2. 引进海外人才，或者直接“窃取” 国外知识产权； 3. 干脆把国外公司给买了，让它变成中国品牌，并中国培养本土的技术力量。


这些想法非常天真。英国从一个欧洲岛国变成工业强国花了150年。德国从欧洲的“山寨国”变成一个制造业的金漆招牌花了近200年。日本从明治维新起就开始工业化，直到1980年代才摆脱“山寨”这个label. 中国真正开始工业化可以说是改开开始，也就是说只有30年。


产业发展中有些东西可以山寨，可以偷，例如产品的造型，基本的功能，甚至图纸，代码等等。但是有两样最基本的东西你怎么也偷不了：高素质的技术人员，和大量的经验技术积累。一个产品核心技术，一般背后累计了最起码5-10年的研发积累。这包括无数失败的方案，各种性能测试数据，设计和优化方法。这些都不是直接写在图纸和代码上，却是工程师通过经验积累体现在字里行间的。在高科技行业，有一句话很正确：就是给你图纸，你都做不出来。因为高端产品在生产过程中有无数细节，只有经验丰富的技术人员才知道如何处理。这些人的培养需要最起码10-15年在和技术不断磨拳搽掌中培养。

Unconditional Support for Israel is Profoundly Damaging to Americans

by Alison Weir

U.S. Aid to Israel: Funding our Decline

On April 1st I participated in a debate in San Francisco that raised the question of US aid to Israel.
It was highly appropriate that this debate was held two weeks before tax day, since in Israel’s sixty years of existence, it has received more US tax money than any other nation on earth.
During periods of recession, when Americans are thrown out of work, homes are repossessed, school budgets cut and businesses fail, Congress continues to give Israel massive amounts of our tax money; currently, about 7 million dollars per day.
On top of this, Egypt and Jordan receive large sums of money (per capita about 1/20th of what Israel receives) to buy their cooperation with Israel; and Palestinians also receive our tax money (about 1/23rd of that to Israel), to repair infrastructure that Israeli forces have destroyed, to fund humanitarian projects required due to the destruction wrought by Israel’s military, and to convince Palestinian officials to take actions beneficial to Israel. These sums should also be included in expenditures on behalf of Israel.
When all are added together, it turns out that for many years over half of all US tax money abroad has been expended to benefit a country the size of New Jersey.
It is certainly time to begin debating this disbursement of our hard-earned money. It is quite possible that we have better uses for it.
To decide whether the US should continue military aid to any nation, it is essential to examine the nature and history of the recipient nation, how it has used our military aid in the past, whether these uses are in accord with our values, and whether they benefit the American taxpayers who are putting up the money.


1. What is the history and nature of Israel?


Describing Israel is always difficult. One can either stay within the mainstream paradigm, or tell the truth. I will opt for the truth.
Drawing on scores of books by diverse authors, the facts are quite clear: Israel was created through one of the most massive, ruthless, and persistent ethnic cleansing operations of modern history. In 1947-49 about three-quarters of a million Muslims and Christians, who had originally made up 95 percent of the population living in the area that Zionists wanted for a Jewish state, were brutally forced off their ancestral land. There were 33 massacres, over 500 villages were completely destroyed, and an effort was made to erase all vestiges of Palestinian history and culture.
The fact is that Israel’s core identity is based on ethnic and religious discrimination by a colonial, immigrant group; and maintaining this exclusionist identity has required continued violence against those it has dispossessed, and others who have given them refuge.


2. How has Israel used our military aid in the past?


In all of its wars except one, Israel has attacked first.
In violation of the Arms Export Control Act, which requires that US weapons only be used in “legitimate self defense,” Israel used American equipment during its two invasions of Lebanon, killing 17,000 the first time and 1,000 more recently, the vast majority civilians. It used American-made cluster bombs in both invasions, again in defiance of US laws, causing the “most hideous injuries” one American physician said she had ever seen, and which, in one day in 1982 alone, resulted in the amputation of over 1,000 mangled limbs.
It has used US military aid to continue and expand its illegal confiscation of land in the West Bank and Golan Heights, and has used American F-16s and Apache Helicopters against largely unarmed civilian populations.
According to Defence for Children International, Israel has “engaged in gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.” Between 1967 and 2003, Israel destroyed more than 10,000 homes, and such destruction continues today. A coalition of UK human rights groups recently issued a report stating that Israel’s blockade of Gaza is collective punishment of 1.5 million people, warning: “Unless the blockade ends now, it will be impossible to pull Gaza back from the brink of this disaster and any hopes for peace in the region will be dashed.”
In addition, Israel uses US military aid to fund an Israeli arms industry that competes with US companies. According to a report commissioned by the US Army War College, “Israel uses roughly 40 percent of its … military aid, ostensibly earmarked for purchase of US weapons, to buy Israeli-made hardware. It also has won the right to require the Defense Department or US defense contractors to buy Israeli-made equipment or subsystems, paying 50 to 60 cents on every defense dollar the US gives to Israel.”
Israel has used US aid to kill and injure nonviolent Palestinian, American and international activists, as well as American servicemen. Israeli soldiers in an American-made Caterpillar bulldozer crushed to death 23-year-old Rachel Corrie; an Israeli sniper shot 21-year-old Tom Hurndall in the head; Israeli soldiers shot 26-year-old Brian Avery in the face. In 1967 Israel used US-financed French aircraft to attack a US Navy ship, killing 34 American servicemen and injuring 174.
Israel has used US aid to imprison without trial thousands of Palestinians and others, and according to reports by the London Times and Amnesty International, Israel consistently tortures prisoners; including, according to Foreign Service Journal, American citizens.


3. Are these uses in accord with our national and personal values?


Not in my view.


4. Do these uses of US aid benefit American taxpayers?


While some Israeli actions have served US interests, the balance sheet is clear: Israel’s use of American aid consistently damages the United States, harms our economy, and endangers Americans.
In fact, this extremely negative outcome was so predictable that even before Israel’s creation virtually all State Department and Pentagon experts advocated forcefully against supporting the creation of a Zionist state in the Middle East. President Harry Truman’s reply: “I am sorry gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.”
Through the years, as noted above, our aid to Israel has not resulted in a reliable ally.
In 1954 Israel tried to bomb American targets in Egypt, intending to pin this on Muslims.
In 1963 Senator William Fulbright discovered that Israel was using a series of covert operations to funnel our money to pro-Israel groups in the US, which then used these funds in media campaigns and lobbying to procure even more money from American taxpayers.
In 1967 Israeli forces unleashed a two-hour air and sea attack against the USS Liberty, causing 200 casualties. While Israel partisans claim that this was done in error, this claim is belied by extensive eyewitness evidence and by an independent commission reporting on Capitol Hill in 2003 chaired by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer.
In 1973 Israel used the largest airlift of US materiel in history to defeat Arab forces attempting to regain their own land, triggering the Arab oil embargo that sent the US into a recession that cost thousands of Americans their jobs.
During its 1980s Lebanon invasion, Israeli troops engaged in a systematic pattern of harassment of US forces brought in as peacekeepers that created, according to Commandant of Marines Gen. R. H Barrow, “life-threatening situations, replete with verbal degradation of the officers, their uniform and country.”
Through the years, Israel has regularly spied on the US. According to the Government Accounting Office, Israel “conducts the most aggressive espionage operations against the United States of any ally.” Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger said of Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard: “It is difficult for me… to conceive of greater harm done to national security,” And the Pollard case was just the tip of a very large iceberg; the most recent operation coming to light involves two senior officials of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Israel’s powerful American lobbying organization.
Bad as the above may appear, it pales next to the indirect damage to Americans caused by our aid to Israel. American funding of Israel’s egregious violations of Palestinian human rights is consistently listed as the number one cause of hostility to Americans.
While American media regularly cover up Israeli actions, those of us who have visited the region first-hand witness a level of US-funded Israeli cruelty that makes us weep for our victims and fear for our country. While most Americans are uninformed on how Israel uses our money, people throughout the world are deeply aware that it is Americans who are funding Israeli crimes.
The 9/11 Commission notes that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s “…animus towards the United States stemmed…from his violent disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel.” The Economist reports that “… the notion of payback for injustices suffered by the Palestinians is perhaps the most powerfully recurrent theme in bin Laden’s speeches.”


The Bottom Line


In sum, US aid to Israel has destabilized the Middle East; propped up a national system based on ethnic and religious discrimination; enabled unchecked aggression that has, on occasion, been turned against Americans themselves; funded arms industries that compete with American companies; supported a pattern of brutal dispossession that has created hatred of the US; and resulted in continuing conflict that last year took the lives of 384 Palestinians and 13 Israelis, and that in the past seven and a half years has cost the lives of more than 982 Palestinian children and 119 Israeli children.
By providing massive funding to Israel, no matter what it does, American aid is empowering Israeli supremacists who believe in a never-ending campaign of ethnic cleansing; while disempowering Israelis who recognize that policies of morality, justice, and rationality are the only road to peace.

It is time to end our aid.

Technology bubble life cycle

Left, Right, what's the difference?

This Left-Right paradigm concept theorizes that the two opposing political parties utilize their tremendous hold over mainstream media to dramatize political distractions and engage in covert warfare and operations, in grand performances of bureaucratic rivalry meant to propagandize and divide the populace. Divisive issues are purposefully fed through the major media outlets to divert attention away from the ruling class's hidden and ulterior (and sometimes global) agendas. By drawing attention to the differences between the two embedded political systems, ideologies, races and classes, the political groups obscure political clarity and divide unity among the masses. The tactic creates confusion and frustration among the population, which enables the ruling class to increase and consolidate their wealth and power through maintaining an illusion of a two-party system of checks and balances that actually works. The theory contends that the fresh interjection of a new political party or group (such as the expanding Libertarian or Green parties) into the political arena, would be the only way to provide a means to break the cyclical paradigm, currently established in the political system.

Can China Lead?: Reaching the Limits of Power and Growth

In the book “Can China Lead?: Reaching the Limits of Power and Growth,” William C. Kirby and F. Warren McFarlan of Harvard Business School and Regina M. Abrami of the Wharton School explore whether China will become the world’s leading power.

Their conclusion: Not necessarily. While there’s much to admire, an absence of political reform could ultimately hobble the nation, they write, taking issue with the believers in the “China model” that it is the absence of political reform that has enabled China to power ahead by mixing authoritarian rule with capitalist practices. During a recent trip to China, Professor Kirby discussed how the Chinese used to be among the richest people in the world, how they may attain that again and why he and his co-authors are skeptical that the country’s ascent is inevitable:

Q.

Can China lead?

A.

Yes, of course. China has led. China is home to the longest continuous civilization in world history. Chinese moral and political models defined what it meant to be civilized. Little more than 200 years ago, the Qing empire presided over the strongest, richest and most sophisticated civilization on the planet. Its economy was the largest and one of the freest in the world. The richest men on earth lived in China.

China survived — better than most parts of the world — the era of imperialism. China’s current “rise,” as its recent growth is often described, is not simply the result of the past 35 years. It has been a century and more in the making.

As China returns to a historical position of strength and centrality, however, the question is: Are China’s current political and economic structures models for others? Can China once again set global standards in values and education that are emulated elsewhere? In the absence of political reform in China, we have our doubts. There are many books that assume an inevitable ascent to global leadership for China. Ours is not one of them.

Q.

Can you explain what you mean by “lead”? Where is it important to lead, and why?

A.

Global leadership has taken many forms in recent centuries. We do not mean — nor do we expect for China — leadership in the form of military expansionism or political dominion. Rather, we mean a broadly compelling influence in global politics, economics and culture that made the 20th century, by some measures, the “American Century.”

Q.

You say in the book that China is making huge strides in infrastructure, entrepreneurship and education, but its fundamental identity as a militarized, one-party state weakens it. Yet some Chinese see this as a strength. How would you answer those who say that your view is essentially a view from the United States, that Chinese “see things differently”?

A.

It is surely true that China’s one-party system, which dates back to the Nationalist era, has the capacity to do some big things better than other systems. The dreams of Sun Yat-sen for a nation connected by rail and road, with its rivers tamed by enormous dams — these have been realized by the modern engineering state that is unchecked in its ambition. China’s new transportation infrastructure is the envy of the world.

Yet that same system leaves much too much of the economy in government monopolies, and it presides over legal and judicial structures in which there is little popular confidence. Why are “civil society” and “constitutional government” among the “seven things not to talk about”?

Q.

You write that China is at an “inflection point” that cannot be ignored and that threatens its future success. Can you discuss the substance of that inflection point?

A.

China has enjoyed enormous success — again, not just in the past three decades, but in its century of recovery. It “stood up,” not just in 1949 but already in 1945, when with Japan’s defeat, it became once again a great power. In economic as in military matters, China’s strength has been a century in the making. The successes of recent decades have been the result of reforms in the economy and society that undid the excesses of the Maoist period. Hundreds of millions of Chinese lifted themselves out of poverty once they were given the chance.

Yet in an era of reform and opening everywhere else, there has been no sustained, systemic political reform. This is not a matter of Chinese versus “Western” political systems. China has a political system rooted in the West — Marx and Lenin, it should be recalled, were not Chinese. A system modeled on that of the Soviet Union presides over a dynamic economy and society.

Why does this matter now? China appears strong and stable. Its borders are secure. It has prospered during the longest period of peace in East Asia since the Opium War. China today is home to many of the world’s most dynamic entrepreneurs. But its ruling party shows signs of insecurity. Why else lock up citizens who simply ask for transparency in government on the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”? China has very able leaders, but they too must work within a political culture of deep constraint, where even the most basic facts of the country’s history cannot be discussed.

The great worry for those who care deeply about China, as we do, is not about its capacity for growth and creativity, which is boundless, but that the world of politics is so tightly bounded that alternative visions of China’s future cannot be discussed openly. Now, we hope, is the time to open what late 19th-century reformers interested in China’s “self-strengthening” called the yan lu, literally a “path of words” to the throne.

Q.

Some people question the idea that education has been greatly strengthened over the last decades, pointing to two trends in recent years: the children of the elite going abroad for university or earlier, and universities recruiting students directly from secondary schools, bypassing the gaokao, or university entrance exams. They argue this is increasing educational inequality. How do you see this?

A.

No country values learning more than China. Because of educational reforms over the course of the 20th century, China has a highly literate population. Today, China has the fastest-growing system — in quality as well as quantity — of higher education in the world. This is why so many of the world’s leading universities (Harvard, Duke, Stanford, Johns Hopkins, New York University and a host of Asian and European institutions) have established research and teaching centers — and, in the cases of Duke and N.Y.U., campuses — in China.

Elite families increasingly send their children abroad, for a host of reasons, but Chinese universities are again part of the global world of scholarship, and they too attract extraordinary students from around the world. Tsinghua University and Peking University are now regularly ranked among the world’s top 50 institutions. If they are allowed to develop, or return to, the traditions of freedom of inquiry and teaching that distinguished them well before 1949, there is no limit to their future. One extraordinarily positive development is the establishment of Schwarzman College at Tsinghua University — an institution poised to bring the world’s most promising talent to China.

It is true that, even with the enormous growth in enrollments in Chinese universities, the percentage of poor and rural students in leading universities declines every year. NGOs such as Teach for China, modeled on Teach for America, seek to address this problem. For the moment, in China, as in the United States, the major beneficiaries of elite higher education remain the — already — well educated and well connected.

Q.

If you were a betting person, how would you bet the future will go for China? Will it overtake the West in some years?

A.

I am very optimistic about China. I am not so sure about the “West.” Just as we in this country often view China too simply, Chinese may see the diverse politics and societies of the “West” as a single entity. I do not.

In our book, we predict that in 2034, China will be richer economically and culturally, its military more powerful, its polity less centralized. And if it can get to that stage without a political explosion, China and the rest of East Asia will thrive.

Leadership is a comparative thing. At present, the United States has huge challenges abroad and at home. China, too, as we suggest, faces enormous challenges, mostly at home. If these two countries are to help steer the world in the 21st century, which they must, there is much work to be done. But if the 21st century is to be the “Chinese Century,” it won’t have been the first, and it won’t be the last.

The State of the World: Assessing China's Strategy

By George Friedman
Simply put, China has three core strategic interests.
Paramount among them is the maintenance of domestic security. Historically, when China involves itself in global trade, as it did in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the coastal region prospers, while the interior of China -- which begins about 160 kilometers (100 miles) from the coast and runs about 1,600 kilometers to the west -- languishes. Roughly two-thirds of all Chinese citizens currently have household incomes lower than the average household income in Bolivia. Most of China's poor are located west of the richer coastal region. This disparity of wealth time and again has exposed tensions between the interests of the coast and those of the interior. After a failed rising in Shanghai in 1927, Mao Zedong exploited these tensions by undertaking the Long March into the interior, raising a peasant army and ultimately conquering the coastal region. He shut China off from the international trading system, leaving China more united and equal, but extremely poor.
The current government has sought a more wealth-friendly means of achieving stability: buying popular loyalty with mass employment. Plans for industrial expansion are implemented with little thought to markets or margins; instead, maximum employment is the driving goal. Private savings are harnessed to finance the industrial effort, leaving little domestic capital to purchase the output. China must export accordingly.
China's second strategic concern derives from the first. China's industrial base by design produces more than its domestic economy can consume, so China must export goods to the rest of the world while importing raw materials. The Chinese therefore must do everything possible to ensure international demand for their exports. This includes a range of activities, from investing money in the economies of consumer countries to establishing unfettered access to global sea-lanes.
The third strategic interest is in maintaining control over buffer states. The population of the historical Han Chinese heartland is clustered in the eastern third of the country, where ample precipitation distinguishes it from the much more dry and arid central and western thirds. China's physical security therefore depends on controlling the four non-Han Chinese buffer states that surround it: Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. Securing these regions means China can insulate itself from Russia to the north, any attack from the western steppes, and any attack from India or Southeast Asia.
Controlling the buffer states provides China geographical barriers -- jungles, mountains, steppes and the Siberian wasteland -- that are difficult to surmount and creates a defense in depth that puts any attacker at a grave disadvantage.

Challenged Interests

Today, China faces challenges to all three of these interests.
The economic downturn in Europe and the United States, China's two main customers, has exposed Chinese exports to increased competition and decreased appetite. Meanwhile, China has been unable to appropriately increase domestic demand and guarantee access to global sea-lanes independent of what the U.S. Navy is willing to allow.
Those same economic stresses also challenge China domestically. The wealthier coast depends on trade that is now faltering, and the impoverished interior requires subsidies that are difficult to provide when economic growth is slowing substantially.
In addition, two of China's buffer regions are in flux. Elements within Tibet and Xinjiang adamantly resist Han Chinese occupation. China understands that the loss of these regions could pose severe threats to China's security, particularly if such losses would draw India north of the Himalayas or create a radical Islamic regime in Xinjiang.
The situation in Tibet is potentially the most troubling. Outright war between India and China -- anything beyond minor skirmishes -- is impossible so long as both are separated by the Himalayas. Neither side could logistically sustain large-scale multi-divisional warfare in that terrain. But China and India could threaten one another if they were to cross the Himalayas and establish a military presence on the either side of the mountain chain. For India, the threat would emerge if Chinese forces entered Pakistan in large numbers. For China, the threat would occur if large numbers of Indian troops entered Tibet.
China therefore constantly postures as if it were going to send large numbers of forces into Pakistan, but in the end, the Pakistanis have no interest in de facto Chinese occupation -- even if the occupation were directed against India. Likewise, the Chinese are not interested in undertaking security operations in Pakistan. The Indians have little interest in sending forces into Tibet in the event of a Tibetan revolution. For India, an independent Tibet without Chinese forces would be interesting, but a Tibet where the Indians would have to commit significant forces would not be. As much as the Tibetans represent a problem for China, the problem is manageable. Tibetan insurgents might receive some minimal encouragement and support from India, but not to a degree that would threaten Chinese control.
So long as the internal problems in Han China are manageable, so is Chinese domination of the buffer states, albeit with some effort and some damage to China's reputation abroad.
The key for China is maintaining interior stability. If this portion of Han China destabilizes, control of the buffers becomes impossible. Maintaining interior stability requires the transfer of resources, which in turn requires the continued robust growth of the Chinese coastal economy to generate the capital to transfer inland. Should exports stop flowing out and raw materials in, incomes in the interior would quickly fall to politically explosive levels. (China today is far from revolution, but social tensions are increasing, and China must use its security apparatus and the People's Liberation Army to control these tensions.)
Maintaining those flows is a considerable challenge. The very model of employment and market share over profitability misallocates scores of resources and breaks the normally self-regulating link between supply and demand. One of the more disruptive results is inflation, which alternatively raises the costs of subsidizing the interior while eroding China's competitiveness with other low-cost global exporters.
For the Chinese, this represents a strategic challenge, a challenge that can only be countered by increasing the profitability on Chinese economic activity. This is nearly impossible for low value-added producers. The solution is to begin manufacturing higher value-added products (fewer shoes, more cars), but this necessitates a different sort of work force, one with years more education and training than the average Chinese coastal inhabitant, much less someone from the interior. It also requires direct competition with the well-established economies of Japan, Germany and the United States. This is the strategic battleground that China must attack if it is to maintain its stability.

A Military Component

Besides the issues with its economic model, China also faces a primarily military problem. China depends on the high seas to survive. The configuration of the South China Sea and the East China Sea render China relatively easy to blockade. The East China Sea is enclosed on a line from Korea to Japan to Taiwan, with a string of islands between Japan and Taiwan. The South China Sea is even more enclosed on a line from Taiwan to the Philippines, and from Indonesia to Singapore. Beijing's single greatest strategic concern is that the United States would impose a blockade on China, not by positioning its 7th Fleet inside the two island barriers but outside them. From there, the United States could compel China to send its naval forces far away from the mainland to force an opening -- and encounter U.S. warships -- and still be able to close off China's exits.
That China does not have a navy capable of challenging the United States compounds the problem. China is still in the process of completing its first aircraft carrier; indeed, its navy is insufficient in size and quality to challenge the United States. But naval hardware is not China's greatest challenge. The United States commissioned its first aircraft carrier in 1922 and has been refining both carrier aviation and battle group tactics ever since. Developing admirals and staffs capable of commanding carrier battle groups takes generations. Since the Chinese have never had a carrier battle group in the first place, they have never had an admiral commanding a carrier battle group.
China understands this problem and has chosen a different strategy to deter a U.S. naval blockade: anti-ship missiles capable of engaging and perhaps penetrating U.S. carrier defensive systems, along with a substantial submarine presence. The United States has no desire to engage the Chinese at all, but were this to change, the Chinese response would be fraught with difficulty.
While China has a robust land-based missile system, a land-based missile system is inherently vulnerable to strikes by cruise missiles, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles currently in development and other types of attack. China's ability to fight a sustained battle is limited. Moreover, a missile strategy works only with an effective reconnaissance capability. You cannot destroy a ship if you do not know where it is. This in turn necessitates space-based systems able to identify U.S. ships and a tightly integrated fire-control system. That raises the question of whether the United States has an anti-satellite capability. We would assume that it does, and if the United States used it, it would leave China blind.
China is therefore supplementing this strategy by acquiring port access in countries in the Indian Ocean and outside the South China Sea box. Beijing has plans to build ports in Myanmar, which is flirting with ending its international isolation, and Pakistan. Beijing already has financed and developed port access to Gwadar in Pakistan, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and it has hopes for a deepwater port at Sittwe, Myanmar. In order for this strategy to work, China needs transportation infrastructure linking China to the ports. This means extensive rail and road systems. The difficulty of building this in Myanmar, for example, should not be underestimated.
But more important, China needs to maintain political relationships that will allow it to access the ports. Pakistan and Myanmar, for example, have a degree of instability, and China cannot assume that cooperative governments will always be in place in such countries. In Myanmar's case, recent political openings could result in Naypyidaw's falling out of China's sphere of influence. Building a port and roads and finding that a coup or an election has created an anti-Chinese government is a possibility. Given that this is one of China's fundamental strategic interests, Beijing cannot simply assume that building a port will give it unrestricted access to the port. Add to this that roads and rail lines are easily sabotaged by guerrilla forces or destroyed by air or missile attacks.
In order for the ports on the Indian Ocean to prove useful, Beijing must be confident in its ability to control the political situation in the host country for a long time. That sort of extended control can only be guaranteed by having overwhelming power available to force access to the ports and the transportation system. It is important to bear in mind that since the Communists took power, China has undertaken offensive military operations infrequently -- and to undesirable results. Its invasion of Tibet was successful, but it was met with minimal effective resistance. Its intervention in Korea did achieve a stalemate but at horrendous cost to the Chinese, who endured the losses but became very cautious in the future. In 1979, China attacked Vietnam but suffered a significant defeat. China has managed to project an image of itself as a competent military force, but in reality it has had little experience in force projection, and that experience has not been pleasant.

Internal Security vs. Power Projection

The reason for this inexperience stems from internal security. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is primarily configured as a domestic security force -- a necessity because of China's history of internal tensions. It is not a question of whether China is currently experiencing such tensions; it is a question of possibility. Prudent strategic planning requires building forces to deal with worst-case situations. Having been designed for internal security, the PLA is doctrinally and logistically disinclined toward offensive operations. Using a force trained for security as a force for offensive operations leads either to defeat or very painful stalemates. And given the size of China's potential internal issues and the challenge of occupying a country like Myanmar, let alone Pakistan, building a secondary force of sufficient capability might not outstrip China's available manpower but would certainly outstrip its command and logistical capabilities. The PLA was built to control China, not to project power outward, and strategies built around the potential need for power projection are risky at best.
It should be noted that since the 1980s the Chinese have been attempting to transfer internal security responsibilities to the People's Armed Police, the border forces and other internal security forces that have been expanded and trained to deal with social instability. But despite this restructuring, there remain enormous limitations on China's ability to project military power on a scale sufficient to challenge the United States directly.
There is a disjuncture between the perception of China as a regional power and the reality. China can control its interior, but its ability to control its neighbors through military force is limited. Indeed, the fear of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is unfounded. It cannot mount an amphibious assault at that distance, let alone sustain extended combat logistically. One option China does have is surrogate guerrilla warfare in places like the Philippines or Indonesia. The problem with such warfare is that China needs to open sea-lanes, and guerrillas -- even guerrillas armed with anti-ship missiles or mines -- can at best close them.

Political Solution

China therefore faces a significant strategic problem. China must base its national security strategy on what the United States is capable of doing, not on what Beijing seems to want at the moment. China cannot counter the United States at sea, and its strategy of building ports in the Indian Ocean suffers from the fact that its costs are huge and the political conditions for access uncertain. The demands of creating a force capable of guaranteeing access runs counter to the security requirements inside China itself.
As long as the United States is the world's dominant naval power, China's strategy must be the political neutralization of the United States. But Beijing must make certain that Washington does not feel so pressured that it chooses blockade as an option. Therefore, China must present itself as an essential part of U.S. economic life. But the United States does not necessarily see China's economic activity as beneficial, and it is unclear whether China can maintain its unique position with the United States indefinitely. Other, cheaper alternatives are available. China's official rhetoric and hard-line stances, designed to generate nationalist support inside the country, might be useful politically, but they strain relations with the United States. They do not strain relations to the point of risking military conflict, but given China's weakness, any strain is dangerous. The Chinese feel they know how to walk the line between rhetoric and real danger with the United States. It is still a delicate balance.
There is a perception that China is a rising regional and even global power. It may be rising, but it is still far from solving its fundamental strategic problems and further yet from challenging the United States. The tensions within China's strategy are certainly debilitating, if not fatal. All of its options have serious weaknesses. China's real strategy must be to avoid having to make risky strategic choices. China has been fortunate for the past 30 years being able to avoid such decisions, but Beijing utterly lacks the tools required to reshape that environment. Considering how much of China's world is in play right now -- Sudanese energy disputes and Myanmar's political experimentation leap to mind -- this is essentially a policy of blind hope.


Read more: The State of the World: Assessing China's Strategy | Stratfor
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世界上的反华国家

波兰

外交上有欧洲垫脚布之称的波兰，历史上屡受外敌欺凌，但却是个超级反华国家，以至
于无耻的地步。1919年巴黎和会，日本想把在一战中趁火打劫搞到的山东权益合法化，
顾维钧在会上慷慨激昂据理力争，各中小国家则在公开或私下场合对中国表示同情。英
美法意各大国一时也有所顾忌。只有一个国家的代表公然跳出来，发表演讲，支持日本
对山东的要求，反对中国－－波兰。直到顾维钧写回忆录，他都不明白和中日都没啥关
系的波兰干嘛要这样做。同样的情况发生在“九一八”事变之后，国际联盟投票表决对
日本进行制裁，连英法等大国都投了赞成票，唯独只有一个国家公开表示反对，那就是
波兰，中国驻国联代表团怎么都想不通，一个跟日本一点关系都没有的国家，为什么这
样做。中国自古跟波兰就无冤无仇可不知怎么搞的无论是北洋政府时代还是中华民国，
乃至现在，波兰总喜欢站在中国对立面。波兰这个国家做什么都不要紧，可是这个国家
对中国一向仇视——不管国民党政府，还是人民政府时期这样仇视中国的国家，不值得
中国人为他同情。2008年，世界主要国家领导人基本都表示将出席北京奥运会，而波兰
总理却宣布将不参加北京奥运会开幕式而代之会见达赖，不得不说波兰人真的具备一种
能力，那就是“波兰的历史，就是一只金丝雀，野心勃勃要吞下两只虎视眈眈的猫（俄
罗斯和德国）的历史。”这次创新了，又招惹了第三只猫（中国）。



蒙古。

不管你相信与否，这个中俄两国之间贫穷落后地广人稀的国家，却是个极为反华的国家
。无论是在蒙的生意人还是旅行者，每年都有很多人被抢劫殴打侮辱。在蒙古，无助的
中国人更是被迫忍气吞声，因为，无论是入室抢劫、拦路哄抢、街头围攻，蒙古警方都
极不作为。低效、低能的蒙古警方必然导致低破案率，而低破案率必然强化案发的数量
和逐步朝恶性事件发展。在蒙古的中蒙混血儿，一般不会主动对别人谈及自己的中国血
统，特别是有中国血统的蒙古官员对此更是讳莫如深，因为这是断送政治前途的危险举
动。表现在外交上则是蒙古国一边倒的“抱腿外交”，对涉及中国的问题，不予反对也
不予支持，持冷漠的态度。2006年，是对中蒙关系颇具考验的一年。只因这一年是大蒙
古国建立800周年。前中国驻蒙大使高树茂出于淡化历史、搁置争议、共同发展的考虑
，说出了“成吉思汗是你们的，也是我们的，既然我们都是成吉思汗的子孙，就要共同
发展”的话，结果被蒙古媒体列为最不受欢迎的外国人之一，说这是大国沙文主义的表
现。这种弥漫在蒙古上空的仇华气息，自1991年蒙古“变色”以来愈演愈甚。

。

越南。

改革开放以后，第一个与中国刀兵相见的国家。自1975年越南统一后，越南开始决定与
苏联发展更为亲密的外交关系。越南党中央亲华派如长征、武元甲等逐渐不再重用，党
章里的毛泽东思想也被取消。在国内开始疯狂排华，打压华侨的正常生活，导致大量越
南华侨返回中国。在中越边境则挑起武装冲突，派遣武装人员越界进行侵扰，打伤边民
，推倒界碑，蚕食边境，制造了浦念岭、庭毫山等事件。随着中国与美国恢复外交接触
，中越两国的关系则开始变得严峻。导致从79年到89年近十年间的中越边境军事冲突。
1979年2月17日中国发动对越战争，3月5日解放军攻克越北方重镇谅山市，谅山以南，
一马平川，无险可守。自古越南叛乱，若中国大军破谅山，越南王即自缚请降。3月6日
至16日解放军全部军队撤回中国境内。此期间解放军运送大批民生工矿物资回国（其中
包括大量中国无偿支援越南的物资），沿途实行焦土政策，对攻占越南城镇进行大规模
劫掠破坏，能拿走的机器设备全部拿走，能破坏的公产全部破坏，一些部队撤退时拼命
扫射放炮，发泄愤懑并在撤退路线上铺设地雷，是为惩罚报复。战争的影响是持久的，
尤其是对越南方面来说。解放军在撤退回中国的过程中回收了此前援助越南的物资，并
使越南的村庄、公路、铁路遭到严重破坏。1999年，在经过多年谈判之後，中国和越南
签署了边界条约，虽然具体分界线仍然被保密。 这次的条约中包含了较小的边界调整
，一些土地被归还给中国。越南官方媒体报道新边界事实上于2001年8月左右实施。在
越的华裔继续受到歧视并被迫移民。今天越南仍然维持著世界上最庞大的陆军之一，其
中的一些原因就是出于对中国的担忧。战后不久主战的黎笋去世，长征上台，中越两国
的摩擦有所减少。90年代苏联解体后，中越两国逐渐恢复交往，形势趋于和平。目前两
国已就陆地部分确定边境线，越南归还小部分领土，但现今仍侵占我南沙群岛大部分岛
屿，并与美国石油公司联合勘探南海石油资源，采取少说多做的方针，企图与南海周边
国家共同蚕食南海资源。虽然中国政府已喊出“主权属我，搁置争议，共同开发”的和
平构想，但越南仍声称对南海拥有全部主权，无视中国抗议，多次单独向联合国提交所
谓的南海划界案，对我国领土野心越来越大，这是值得当今中国所警惕的。目前中国还
是对越采用“和为贵”的和政策。



印尼

东南亚极端反华排华的国家。历史上曾经发生过很多大规模的排华屠杀迫害事件：1945
年11月泗水惨案；1946年三月万隆惨案，同年六月山口洋惨案，九月巴亚迪惨案；1947
年一月巨港惨案；1963年3月到5月的排华骚乱；1965年至67年的排华浪潮；1974年反日
排华骚乱；1978年雅加达学生反华骚乱；1980年11月印尼爪哇排华暴动；1998年5月13
日那场震撼世人的反华暴乱，1200名华人被屠杀，数百名华人妇女被强暴，5000多家华
人店铺住宅被破坏；2000年暴动俩周年之际，数千暴徒聚集雅加达，攻击掠夺华人商店
。其实中国和印尼之间有很多故事， 可中国有很多的不得已，记得某位领导人说过：
中国不怕打仗。 中国对印尼排华事态的反应与每一位领导人的性格有关。 我希望中国
的领导人不要把中国带入无休止的战争之中，前提是世界对中国的尊重。我这里有一些
当初的照片，起初没敢往上传，太血腥，太惨了，日本的南京大屠杀也不过尔尔，大家
有机会看看，看恐怖片晚上做恶梦，把他当做历史看吧，用一句别人的话说就是：半夜
醒来浑身是汗，绝对不是恐惧的汗水，是抗争的汗水 我们在现实中所做不到的，让我
们在梦中救起被折磨的婴儿。。。。。。



印度

印度是个很复杂的国家，独立以后，一直想成为一个地区大国，于是找上了中国。我们
敬爱的周总理曾在1959年冒着风险访问印度，到机场迎接他的确是印方有意安排的暴怒
的人群，以至于周总理气愤的鼻血流了出来。随后中印战争爆发，印军迅速溃败。战争
结果极大地刺激了印度人的自尊心，此后两国关系紧张。改革开放后，中国经济腾飞，
印度像一只吃不到葡萄的狐狸一样，什么都要中国比一比，总是在中国背后指指点点。
2009年美国总统奥巴马访华回国后，印度总理立刻访美，迫不及待的提醒美国，只有印
度才是美国在“自由世界”的完美伙伴，不要过分重视对华关系。这种急功近利的方式
，不知道会不会像中国大跃进一样，越走越极端，最后走到一个死胡同里。



新加坡

中国威胁不了新加坡，而且对新加坡一直很友好，友好的都有点纵容。但这个弹丸小国
却每每跳出来充当反华排头兵。新加坡独立后就立刻宣称，要做东南亚最后一个与中国
建交的国家，即使建交了也要继续保持与台湾的军事合作关系，而且新加坡也说到做到
了。李光耀上台后不只一次公开宣称要让中国成为二流国家。为了平衡中国在东盟中的
影响，新加坡硬拉印度加入东盟会谈，而且经常与印度举行联合军演。2003年中国遭受
非典之际，新加坡总理吴作栋响应美国华盛顿邮报“封杀中国”的号召，公然拒绝访问
中国。《联合早报》论坛得意洋洋地说“吴作栋的举动得到东南亚国家的赞扬和欢迎”
。 吴作栋接受媒体采访的时候公开质疑中国治理SARS的能力，宣称中国会花掉2到3年
的时间来治理SARS，在此期间，外资应该撤离中国，而不应该“把所有鸡蛋放在一个篮
子里”。并且带头拒绝邀请中国参加当年的东盟峰会。2009年，前总理李光耀更是公开
演讲：提醒美国必须加紧遏制中国，否则就来不及了。



韩国

中韩俩国隔海相望，是一衣带水的邻邦，但由于历史原因，只到1992年俩国才正式建交
。中韩恩怨多是由于历史问题的影响，１９５１年中国志愿军越过３８线进入韩国作战
，据韩国人声称中国军队在韩国曾经屠杀了上百万韩国人。因此韩国人在要求日本道歉
的同时，也一直要求中国为朝鲜战争中侵略韩国的行为道歉。因为在联合国１９５１年
的决议中，中国被判定为侵略者，而且这个决议到现在仍然有效。另外，韩国也多次抗
议中国把韩国首都称为“汉城”。“汉城”是韩国作为中国属国时，中国对韩国首都的
称呼。“汉城”有汉人之城的意思，韩国人认为这是对韩国的侮辱。韩国建议中国把韩
国首都“汉城”改称为“汉城”，但中国政府一直对此保持沉默。“5.12”汶川地震后
韩国网络上弥漫着幸灾乐祸的谩骂，韩国总统也只是发表那几句干巴巴的慰问词，只要
地震后几个月才象征性的派出一支救援队赶赴中国。其它诸如“端午申遗”“孔子是韩
国人”等问题，让人不得不提出疑问：这个实行“抱腿外交”的半岛国家为什么如此自
大。



法国

中法建交很早，而且历来友好，关系出现波折是最近20年的事。1989年东欧剧变后，中
国国内爆发学生运动，当时中国驻法大使吴建明要求会见法国部长要员被拒绝，法国政
府的理由是：“你们那个政府能否存在到明天还是疑问，现在没有会见的必要。”吴建
民义正言辞回答：“看我们谁能笑到最后。”2008年奥运火炬在巴黎传递的一幕，已经
让世人看到了法国媒体、巴黎市政厅、法国政党的幸灾乐祸，之后法国总统萨科奇宣称
将拒绝出席北京奥运会要会见达赖喇嘛，之后再一番权衡后不得不放弃这些打算灰溜溜
的来到北京。傲慢的法国自认高人一等，以为自己有资格对中国人权问题指指点点，傲
慢与偏见遮蔽了法国人的双眼给这个文明之都蒙上了一层厚厚的阴影。



日本

近代以来，没有那个国家像日本一样给中国造成这么沉痛的伤害。中国俩次近代化之路
都是亡于日本之手：洋务运动因中日甲午战争而全面失败；20世纪20年代中国民族工业
的春天因为日本的全面侵华而中断。百万将士战死疆场，千万同胞丧于屠戮，数不清的
城镇工矿被掠夺毁灭，而对于这一切日本政府至今仍没有明确的道歉态度，“八一五”
拜鬼年年上演。歪曲历史的教科书层出不穷，驻华武官常年从事经济政治间谍工作，每
年“九一八”都会有一伙别有用心的日本旅游团来华“公开买春”。暗中支持“台独”
包庇各种反华势力，秘密制定各种“解体中国”的方案。铭记：日本亡我之心不死。“
前事不忘，后事之师”。



美国

这是当今全球最大最强最无耻的“黑社会”，带着警察的面具干着歹徒的勾当。1949年
以后唯一敢公开全面侵略中国主权的国家，建国最初的十年，每年侵入我国领空的美国
飞机据不完全统计有300多架，地面冲突十年里有200多次。正面直接武装侵略朝鲜越南
，一南一北夹制中国，中间出兵台湾海峡，是两岸目前无法统一的最大障碍。暗中资助
“藏独”“**”及海外民运等各种反华反共势力，培植大量亲美分裂势力，策反在美留
学生。70年代以前多次调集舰队在我东海黄海南海地区武装逼近大陆。六十多年来不间
断的对华进行颠覆、刺杀、破坏、侦查行动。环中国设置大量军事基地。国际上制造“
中国威胁论”，经济上胁迫人民币贬值，政治上批评中国人权。。毛主席说过：“帝国
主义亡我之心不死”，当今世界上“十个反华九个亲美”。解决问题还要看主要矛盾是
什么。